In an article on the early political development in Mesopotamia, Steinkeller argues that the northern and southern political systems were inherently different due to the ethnic differences of the people that governed them (107-129). He notes that Northern and Central Mesopotamia, predominantly Akkadian, developed a centralized government, while southern Mesopotamia, predominantly Sumerian, maintained a city-state style of rule. Was there indeed a difference in the intrinsic political systems of the north and the south? If so, was this discrepancy indeed an ethnic one or was it merely due to differences in geographic location? Hans Nissen argued that both centralized and localized governments were present in early Mesopotamia. He insisted that the differences in the northern and southern governments at a particular time were merely the product of cycles of centralization and decentralization. This theory counteracts Steinkeller’s idea that there were ethnic distinctions in the style of rule of the Sumerians and the Akkadians. Even if Steinkeller’s conclusion that the north and the south had different administrative systems, this variation mostly likely did not stem from ethnic differences as there did not seem to be a complete segregation of the two peoples and the two styles of government. Also, even if there were inherent differences in the style of rule of the north and the south, these variations could not serve as enough of a basis to distinguish ethnicity.
In the Pre-Sargonic periods, southern Mesopotamia, predominantly Sumerian, was a collection of city-state governments. Each city was depicted as the “private property of an extended divine family” (Steinkeller, 1993, 116). The main god, the “head of the family,” was the administrator of the whole state (Steinkeller, 1993, 116). Minor deities were the owners of towns and villages on the periphery of the city. All of the major divine families were melded into one extended family of gods under Enlil, the chief god of Nippur (Steinkeller, 1993, 117). Thus, there was an overarching religious unification in all of southern Mesopotamia, as Enlil held supreme power in all conflicts between city-states, especially border disputes.
In each city, there was a main temple situated on a large platform. The temple served as the most important building in each city and it was devoted to its main “city-god” (Kramer 73-74). The importance of the temples in early southern Mesopotamia implied that the temples and their administrators were inherently powerful. However, the temple only owned a certain portion of the land, which it loaned out to sharecroppers. Most of the land was owned by individual citizens, primarily the wealthy families and the nobility (Kramer 74). Though the temple had a certain hold over its citizenry, most of the political power of the city-state lied in the hands of the ensi (city-governor) and the free citizens (Kramer 74). The ensi served as the divine representative of city-god and carried out many of the political and economic duties of the state. The central government was primarily a form of “primitive democracy” where free men had a say in the politics of the city (Postgate 80). The bicameral city assembly (ukkin) was the major institution of political debate and decision (Postgate 81). This system provided a sense of democratic government rather than an autocracy led by the ensi. Thus, the ensi was primarily a religious and political leader, rather than an authority on religion and politics. The city-states were primarily based on agriculture for economic subsistence. Thus, the general population consisted primarily of farmers, artisans, and craftsman (Kramer 90). As political tension between the city-states grew, a military leader, the king, was established. The king was primarily responsible for the military administration (Kramer 74).
In predominantly Akkadian central and northern Mesopotamia, predominantly Akkadian, Steinkeller argued that there was an inherently different political system in the Pre-Sargonic periods. Steinkeller presumes that during the Early Dynastic II and III periods, northern Mesopotamia formed a “single territorial state or … a single political configuration” (117). He argues that this unification originated from a city-based oligarchy like that of Ebla (1993, 121). He postulates that the center of this Early Dynastic “empire” was the city of Kish, while secondary centers were at Akshak and Mari. Steinkeller supports the argument that Mesopotamia was indeed a unified political unit with the following evidence:
The conclusion [that there was an expansive and powerful political entity in northern Bablyonia prior to the reign of Sargon] is inescapable, I believe, when one considers the paramount position that Kish is known to have occupied in the power-play of early Babylonia. Here it will suffice to mention such facts as the involvement of the Kishite king Mesilim in the affairs of southern Babylonia, the tradition of conflict between the First Dynasty of Uruk and Kish … and the testimony of the Sumerian King List, according to which Kish produced the first “historical” dynasty. (119).
In addition to this evidence, Steinkeller also noted that all commercial exchanges between southern and northern Babylonia were conducted through Kish. Thus, he argued that Kish must have controlled all of northern Babylonia. However, another possibility is that Kish was merely the economic center, but not the political center, of northern Mesopotamia and thus all commerce was shipped through the city. In either case, Kish exerted a great influence over northern Babylonia.
Steinkeller insists that there were major differences in the political and economic administration of the north and the south. Following Steinkeller’s arguments, it is evident that the political systems were intrinsically different in the north and the south. The north consisted of a centralized government situated at Kish, while the south was a confederation of city-states. The political leadership in the two regions was also vastly different. In the south, the kings and the governor had both secular and religious powers and relatively weak control over the cities (Steinkeller, 1993, 120). On the other hand, northern kingship was “strong, authoritarian, and predominantly secular” (Steinkeller, 1993, 120). Steinkeller supports this notion by noting that the title of the “King of Kish” referred to an autocratic form of kingship rather than the control of Kish in a literal sense. Thus, when a king gained this title, he had complete autocratic rule over Kish (Steinkeller, 1993, 120). Steinkeller also notes that the word Kish relates to the Akkadian words for power, totality, strength, and “the status of a person remaining under the control of another” (1993, 120).
According to Steinkeller, there were also major social and economic differences between the north and the south. He argues that the south was mainly a temple community with all of its members having equal religious standing and social stratification based on “wealth rather than origin” (Steinkeller, 1993, 121). Steinkeller contends that the northern society was more rigidly stratified, due to the addition of slavery. He argues that slavery first appeared in the north as the Sumerian words for “slave” and “client” are Semitic loanwords, and thus Sumerians did not have an institution of slavery until much later than the Akkadians (1993, 121). In the south, Steinkeller insists that the economy was primarily dependent on “self-sufficient temple-households which controlled most of the resources of the city-states, including nearly all of their agricultural lands” (1993, 122). Contrary to Steinkeller’s claim, Kramer states that much of the agricultural lands were controlled by the private sector and the temple households only controlled a small proportion of the land (74-75). Steinkeller accounts for this argument by noting that the importance of temple-households was greatest in the far south and the influence gradually declined farther north. Thus, Kramer may have merely sampled areas that were not in the far south. In the northern Mesopotamia, Steinkeller claims that the economy was more oriented towards the royal and the private sector rather than the religious sector. This implies that the northern economy was based more on political affiliation rather than on religious affiliation.
Steinkeller argues that the differences in the north and the south were not merely due to the single instance of Kish as a centralized state, but that there was an overarching difference in the mentality of southerners and northerners. Thus, Steinkeller presents another example of centralization in northern Syria that parallels the government of northern Babylonia. Steinkeller argues that the political and economic organization of Ebla was very similar to that of northern Babylonia. He notes that the palace was the main agricultural center of Ebla and that the temple household did not exist at Ebla (1993, 124). He also states that there was a clearly stratified social structure in Ebla, where the aristocracy held most of the ruling power (1993, 124).
To account for these vast differences in government, Steinkeller hypothesizes that these were ethnic differences in the occupants of these two regions. In doing so, he accounts for the abrupt end of the Uruk expansion. He insists that Uruk expansion served to create trade networks rather than to secure resources, as such a vast expansion would not be necessary in order to merely secure resources. Steinkeller presumes that the Uruk expansion continued until a new people arrived in Northern Mesopotamia (1993, 116). This new group, the Akkadians, would have effectively terminated the trading networks established by the southern Mesopotamian (Steinkeller, 1993, 116). Steinkeller’s argument of ethnic differences in the north and south also accounts for the Sargonic unification of Mesopotamia. As there was already a very centralized government in the north, the unification of all of Mesopotamia was merely a step in the natural progression towards an overarching centralized government.
If there were indeed differences between the governments of the north and the south, these differences can be explained through differences in the geographic regions of the two populations, rather than differences of ethnicity. Southern Mesopotamia was situated in the flood region of the Euphrates (Postgate 6). Thus, the inhabitants of Southern Mesopotamia likely relied heavily on the rivers for farming, irrigation, fishing, etc (Nissen 94). As a result, their economy may have been more conducive to a small city government that allowed for the swift distribution of water. As such, they could have formed small self-sufficient city-states. Northern Syria was a much more arid region and thus the economy was based primarily on livestock. Unlike the Southern Mesopotamian, the people of Northern Syria were not self-sufficient. Hence, a more centralized government needed to be established in the north to allow for exchange of goods between various specialized farmers in that region. As the Northern Syrians settled in northern Babylonia, they may have spread their style of government to this region. Though this argument is based on little evidence, it seems entirely as plausible as Steinkeller’s ethnicity argument.
There are several flaws to Steinkeller’s arguments and consequently to the geographic location argument. Steinkeller admits that he obtained much of his evidence of a different political system in the north and south by extrapolation from the texts found at the border areas between the south and the north (such as Nippur and Isin) and from later texts (1993, 127). Thus, Steinkeller had very limited factual evidence about the political and economic structure of northern Babylonia. He accounts for this by stating that the Pre-Sargonic north showed closer ties with northern Syria than southern Babylonia from the evidence present (1993, 127). Thus, he postulates that the practices of northern Babylonia and those of northern Syria had common origin. Assuming this is correct, Steinkeller infers that “the development which occurred within greater Mesopotamia during the third millennium would, to a large extent, be the result of an interaction between two distinct traditions: the southern, or Sumerian tradition, and the northern, or Syrian tradition, with northern Babylonia being the locus of their direct contact” (1993, 127).
Even after assuming that northern Babylonia was as depicted by Steinkeller, the argument that there was an ethnic difference between the Sumerians and the Akkadians in their style of rule does not seem reliable. Yoffee notes that “Steinkeller’s dichotomy breaks down under the weight of his own evidence: There are other city-states in the north [Akshak and Mari] … Sumerian gods and Sumerian place-names are found in the north from the beginning; and the earliest texts are nearly identical [in northern Babylonia] as in the south (Uruk)” (Yoffee, 290-291). The evidence presented by Yoffee shows that there were no likely ethno-political differences in the north and the south, as there were Sumerians in both the north and the south and southern style of government is found in the north. Hence, even if there were underlying differences in style of rule of the north and the south, these differences were not the result of ethnic distinctions between the Sumerians and the Akkadians.
The political differences of two peoples cannot be enough evidence to classify the peoples into two ethnic groups. Two groups can have two different governments and still be ethnically indistinguishable. This is most likely the case in ancient Mesopotamia. The presumed difference in government does not necessarily signify a difference in ethnicity.
The principle that ethnicity cannot be determined by government holds true throughout history. A similarity between the government of two peoples does not necessarily signify that they are a part of one ethnic group. An example of this is the constitutional monarchy style of government. England and Spain both use this form of government. However, the English and Spanish peoples are ethnically distinct. Thus, even though the two groups of people have the same government, they are not necessarily ethnically identical.
In Mesopotamia, there is no evidence that the Sumerians and the Akkadians were different nation-states, contrary to the arguments of Steinkeller. In the book Ethnicity and Nationalism, Eriksen defines the functions of the nation-state: “The nation-state, unlike many other political systems, draws on an ideology proclaiming that political boundaries should be coterminous with cultural boundaries. Further, the nation-state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and taxation” (109). In Mesopotamia, this was not the case. The Sumerians were not unified based on ethnicity, but they were primarily unified based on their ties to the city. Yoffee argues that Jacobsen’s view on the ethnicity of Mesopotamia seems to be the most accurate: “There are certain differences in northern and southern customs and norms, and Akkadian speakers clearly cluster to the north, but Jacobsen’s conclusion that the city-state is the primary arena for social and political action (vs attachment to an ethnic or linguistic group) still seems wisest” (Yoffee 291).
Another aspect of style of government that hinders its determination of ethnicity is that government is constantly evolving. Thus, while government continues to change, ethnicity may stagnate. This principle applies to the Russian people. Over the span of a hundred years, their government has shifted from monarchy (Czar) to communism to democracy. However, the ethnic identity of the Russian people remained relatively the same. The culture, religion, and society of Russia have evolved at a much slower rate than the government.
The style of government in Mesopotamia continued to evolve from the city-state and centralized government of the Pre-Sargonic period to the unified government of the Old Akkadian empire (Sargonic empire) and the unified highly bureaucratic government of the Ur III period. However, the ethnicity of the people of Mesopotamia did not significantly change. In “Settlement Patterns and Material Culture of the Akkadian Period: Continuity and Discontinuity,” Nissen argues that the unification of Babylonia in the Sargonic period followed “an underlying cultural continuity” with the period that precedes it (91). Nissen argues that the changes in politics, art, and language during the Old Akkadian period were merely steps in the continuous development of Mesopotamia. He notes that there were many attempts at the political unification of Babylonia, coinciding with Steinkeller’s view that northern Babylonia was indeed unified (93). He argues that the system of decentralized power was “apparently not deemed satisfactory, and thus we see repeated attempts to create larger territorial units, which, however, never lasted long” (93). In effect, Nissen suggests that the foundations for centralized political power were in effect in the Pre-Sargonic period. However, none of the decentralized governments were strong enough to create a centralized government (Nissen 93).
Nissen also notes that in history there were periodic shifts between centralized government and decentralized government, with each having its advantages and disadvantages. He mentions that the cities and the city-states were built around a branching point in the system of irrigation canals, as this spot “decides how much and how regular the water intake would be for the entire system (94). Nissen argues that these canal systems provided both advantages and disadvantages for local and centralized governments:
The principle of particularism [city-state government] provides an optimal care for the local needs of the irrigation and settlement system but is unable to provide schemes for the solution of built-in interlocal conflicts. Centrality, on the other hand, provides such a higher level of conflict resolution but is less effective when it comes to answer local problems (Nissen 94).
Thus, this leads to the conclusion that style of government was more determined by convenience of rule. Thus, there was merely a cycle of centralized and decentralized government rather than any kind of ethnic incorporation. Nissen argues against Steinkeller’s notion that the Akkadians founded the principle of centralized government citing that the first attempts at uniting Babylonia were made by Sumerians (Nissen 98).
Steinkeller’s ethnicity argument breaks down when considering the continuity between the Old Akkadian Empire and the Sumerian Ur III dynasty, while Nissen’s argument of natural continuity seems to hold true. Many elements of the political and economic administration of the Sargonic period appeared in the Ur III bureaucracy. The Ur III dynasty merely created a more comprehensive bureaucracy than the Old Akkadian dynasty.
The Old Akkadian Empire created a rather extensive system of political, economic, and military administration. In the structural hierarchy of the government, the commander-in-chief of the army as well as the leader of the entire empire was the king (Foster 26). The chief military officer after the king was the general, who had control of a standing army (if it existed) and the king’s staff supplied to each city, including couriers, aides, physicians, and diviners (Foster 26). The local government was controlled by the ensi, the city ruler, who was responsible for local political administration and “levying the city militia” (Foster 26). In the realm of political administration, the “major domo” was the major administrative officer after the king. This chief administrator had regional responsibilities and he transcended the ensi in both power and scope (Foster 26).
The political and military organization of the Sumerian Ur III dynasty was very similar to that of the Sargonic Empire. As in the Old Akkadian Empire, the king was the commander-in-chief of the army and the chief political administrator (Steinkeller, 1987, 15-21). Next, there was the chancellor, the second in command, who was responsible for “civil administration, the army, foreign relations, and the conduct of law” (Steinkeller, 1987, 21). The land of the empire was subdivided into the core (Diyala region) and the periphery (lands around the Diyala region), each of which were administered differently (Steinkeller, 1987, 19). At the regional level of the core, there were governors and generals, whose tasks mirrored the Sargonic equivalent of the ensi and the general. The governors were appointed royally though they usually stemmed from the local population. Their duties included administration of the temples and their employees (Steinkeller, 1987, 20). The generals were the provincial military commander. Their duties included the administration of military personnel and royal dependents (Steinkeller, 1987, 20). The system of governors and generals established a balance of power in provincial control. At the next level of government, the mayors held jurisdiction over the towns and villages (Steinkeller, 1987, 20). In the periphery, the major administrators were generals, who had both civilian and military authority (Steinkeller, 1987, 30).
The political organization of the Ur III period was largely based on Sargonic organization. Thus, the Ur III bureaucracy merely created a more organized and comprehensive version of the Old Akkadian bureaucracy. In Ur III, the kings instituted various measures to ensure that no province and no leader would become too powerful and overturn the empire. They also created new positions at various levels of government in order to better resolve local disputes.
The economic bureaucracy of the Ur III period was also merely an improvement on the Old Akkadian system. The Old Akkadian government developed a simplistic system of taxation and distribution of royal lands. Various plots of land were given to the elite administrators, priests, and other public servants for their own subsistence (Foster 29). In the common community, families held “shares in different fields to distribute evenly risks, labor, and returns from cultivation” (Foster 30). Land that was distributed to the ensi was loaned out to such families for subsistence or lease (Foster 30). In return for this land, the user needed to pay a portion of the harvest and a cash payment to the ensi (Foster 30). In turn, part of this payment was given to the king (Foster 30). This system provided for the “incorporation of private individuals and their families into the royal extended household without their becoming dependents” (Foster 31). In order to ensure proper redistribution of goods, the common laborers were paid in rations that compensated them for their work (Foster 32). Thus, the Sargonic economic system accounted for all of the land and provided a relatively simple method of taxation and redistribution.
The Ur III economic system was primarily based on the same principles of distribution of land, redistribution of goods, and taxation. However, the Ur III system was more developed and more expansive. In the core, land was distributed among three different domains: the royal domain, the temple domain, and the private sector (Steinkeller, 1987, 22). The temple households were royally owned in the Ur III period. As such, they contributed surplus production to the crown (Steinkeller, 1987, 22). The royal domain was primarily based on royally owned land loaned to military personnel and royal industrial complexes (Steinkeller, 1987, 22). The royal dependents of this land contributed services and taxes, while the larger complexes contributed a portion of the goods that they produced (Steinkeller, 1987, 22). Not enough is known about the private sector to assess its contribution to the state (Steinkeller, 1987, 22). The administrators of the Ur III bureaucracy also created a very centralized system of redistribution of goods with the bala institution. While the primary goal of this tax was to provide goods for the temples of the holy city of Nippur, the bala system also provided an excellent means of payment and distribution of taxes (Steinkeller, 1987, 22-23). In the bala system, each province donated a certain amount of its goods and service to meet its obligations to the crown. After this amount had been met, additional goods and services were exchanged with other provinces (Steinkeller, 1987, 23). In the periphery, the Ur III administration created a similar system of taxation, the gún ma-da, where landowners had to contribute a certain amount of livestock in a yearly tax (Steinkeller, 1987, 25-32).
The economic bureaucracy of the Ur III period was also merely an extension of the economic system of the Old Akkadian period. The Sargonic administration had a basic system of land distribution, taxation, and redistribution of goods. The Ur III bureaucracy merely modified the Old Akkadian system for more efficient land distribution (the three domain system), more effective taxation, and a more extensive system of redistribution of goods (the bala system).
The governments of the Pre-Sargonic period, the Old Akkadian period, and the Ur III period all seemed to follow a natural continuity as hypothesized by Nissen. The Old Akkadian and the Ur III governments appeared to incorporate central governments that provided for better global conflict resolution and localized administration that facilitated local conflict resolution. This idea of centralized government with local branches seemed to follow a natural progression from the cycle of city-state and centralized governments of the Pre-Sargonic period as hypothesized by Nissen. There was also a natural continuity between the Old Akkadian government and the Ur III government, in that the Ur III government expanded on most of the Sargonic ideas of political and economic administration. This natural progression serves to support Nissen’s theory and invalidate Steinkeller’s hypothesis. If there was a natural continuity between the government of the Old Akkadian government and the Sumerian Ur III government, then style of government cannot be used to distinguish Sumerians and Akkadians as two ethnic groups. Though Steinkeller argues that the Sumerian and the Akkadian cultures blended to produce one form of government (1993, 127-128), it is more likely that the people of ancient Babylonia merely adopted a government that was best suited for their economic and social needs.
Steinkeller’s conclusion that ethnicity played a major role in the administration of third millennium Babylonia does not seem adequately supported by historical evidence. He bases his argument on the fact that there were inherently different styles of government in northern Babylonia and southern Babylonia. By arguing that the Akkadian north was primarily a centralized style of government and the Sumerian south was a localized style of government, Steinkeller attempts to establish an ethnic distinction between the two groups based on their varying political and economic ideologies. However, there is no conclusive evidence that such a distinct difference in government ever existed. In fact, Hans Nissen argues that centralized government first developed in southern Babylonia and not in the north. Even if Steinkeller’s presumption about the varying styles of government holds true, there is no evidence that this distinction in government is an ethnic one. As city-state governments were found in the north and Sumerian names were found in both the north and the south, there seems to be no clear distinction of a “Sumerian” and an “Akkadian” government (Yoffee 291). Also, the fact that both the Akkadians (in the Sargonic Period) and the Sumerians (in the Ur III Period) formed centralized governments implies that there was no ethnic attachment to government.
Several other theories seem more adequate in explaining the vast changes of political organization in Mesopotamia. One theory is that government was merely determined by geographic location and that some areas were more conducive towards local government while others were conducive towards centralized government. This argument is also based on little evidence, but it seems plausible as it accounts for the early differences in government and it does not conflict with later centralization. Nissen’s argument that the style of government continually evolved appears the most reasonable. This argument accounts for the gradual development of more organized centralized government as shown in the progression from the Pre-Sargonic period to the Old Akkadian period to the Ur III period.
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